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This paper argues that existing critiques of technical fixes are unable to explain our simultaneous 
enamourment and distrust with technical fixes, and that to do so, we need a political economy 
analysis. We develop a critical, theoretically grounded conceptualisation of technical fixes as 
imagined defensive spatio-temporal fixes of specific political economic regimes, and apply it to the 
case of geoengineering, or ‘clean fossil’, as an attempted technical fix of the climate change 
problem. We map the promises of clean fossil as proposed solutions to the problem of climate 
change in discrete episodes since the 1960s.  
The paper shows that clean fossil promises have been surprisingly poorly aligned with the neoliberal 
regime, and explains how they have been moderately stable due to those misalignments. We also 
show that different liberal capitalisms could be supported by different clean fossil technologies, but 
also that illiberal or more egalitarian regimes remain possible alongside particular, perhaps radically 
re-envisioned, versions of clean fossil. Ambivalence towards clean fossil technical fix promises is 
intelligible, given the inherent instability of their co-evolution with neoliberalism and future political 
regimes.  
 





Technical fixes imply a use of ‘the power of technology to solve problems that are nontechnical in 
nature’ [1 p. 21]. This framing goes back to the mid-1960s, when Alvin M. Weinberg, physicist, made 
the case for technology’s potential to offer cheap and effective solutions to problems ranging from 
population growth, poverty, energy needs, and water shortages [2]. Citing the difficulty of solving 
problems by influencing people’s motivations and behaviour, Weinberg described technical fixes as 
‘cheap … shortcuts’ [2 p. 141] ‘that are within the grasp of modern technology, and which would 
either eliminate the original social problem without requiring a change in the individual’s social 
attitudes, or would so alter the problem as to make its resolution more feasible’ [2 p. 9].  
Weinberg’s optimism about technical fixes was criticized even by contemporaries [3, 4], and the 
term is rarely used with positive connotations today. Instead, technical fix has become a dismissive 
label for quick and cheap fixes that are ‘partial, ineffective, unsuccessful, threatening, one-sided as 
opposed to holistic, mechanical as opposed to ecological’ [3 p.3]. The phrase seems to indicate an 
improper problem bounding, where ‘what is addressed is not the real problem but the problem in as 
far as it is amenable to technical solutions’ [5 p. 152].   
In public debates over science and technology, the ‘technical fix criticism’ is a rhetorical tactic in its 
own right [6]. For example, in the world of information and communication technology, ‘technical 
fix’ has become a stock accusation levied against product demonstrations where efficiency is only 
proved to the spectator by using a ‘technology design framing that constructs organizational 
practices too narrowly’ [7 p. 472]. This usage suggests that the limitations of technological naivety 
are obvious, and that public awareness of the political character of technology is well-established. 
Yet, an enamourment-distrust paradox remains. Despite consistent expressions of disillusionment, 
the popularity of promised technical fixes continues to demonstrate society’s focus on technology 
when solving problems [3, 6, 8], and a sustained ambivalence about technical fixes. 
We argue here that the existing literature on technical fixes is unable to explain satisfactorily this 
paradoxical resilience of technical fixes, and especially so in circumstances where fixes are seen to 
be both problematic in practical terms and normatively contested. To explain this, we need an 
analytical framework capable of analysing what technical fixes do, practically, culturally and 
politically, as both promises and implemented systems. Specifically, the framework needs to be 
capable of explaining which fixes are supported, what interests they defend, and when they might 
work or fail. For this purpose, we develop a cultural political economy of science and technology 
framework drawing on Tyfield [9, 10], and apply it to the empirical case of geoengineering as a 
technical fix to the climate change problem. 
Climate change first emerged as a policy concern in the 1960s, soon followed by proposals for 
engineering solutions that would allow us to preserve our fossil fuel-based society [11, 12, 13, 14]. 
Since then, geoengineering, or ’clean fossil’, in various forms has remained a part of climate policy. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, two technical approaches were discussed: (1) changing the reflectivity of the 
planet (today referred to as solar radiation management, SRM), and (2) sequestering CO2 (currently 
referred to as carbon dioxide removal, CDR). From the 1990s, capture of CO2 from large point 
sources – especially fossil fuelled power plants – and subsequent sequestration in geological 
formations (carbon dioxide capture and storage, CCS) was the most prominent technical fix promise. 
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In the last 15 years, the term geoengineering, defined to include all clean fossil apart from CCS, has 
been used to frame a revived interest in several other geoengineering technologies, cf. Figure 1.  
We include geoengineering technologies in the category of ‘clean fossil’ because the promise of 
geoengineering is precisely to come to the rescue when fossil fuel based emissions prove hard to 
avoid. Notable exclusions from the category include renewables, which are disruptive to fossil fuel 
use, and more efficient power plants, which are merely incrementally cleaner than existing 
technology. 
Whilst there have been research and a few demonstration projects for some technology variants 
(including several CCS demonstration plants), overall clean fossil remains unimplemented. There is, 
however, a range of active technology specific research and development communities [15, 16, 17], 
with varying levels of industry and state involvement, and actors who are interested in 
geoengineering as a whole. While the communities around CCS and geoengineering are distinct, 
some actors (including researchers like ourselves) have overlapping interest in both areas [18, 19, 
20, 21].  
 
 
Figure 1. The different categories of clean fossil technology. The dashed line signifies geoengineering 
(GE). BECCS = CCS on bioenergy fuelled power plant. 
 
Geoengineering is a technical fix par excellence, calling on technological solutions to complex (socio-
environmental) problems on an unprecedented, planetary scale in ways that would profoundly – and 
deliberately – redefine our relationship with, and position in, the Earth system as one of human 
technological mastery [22, 23]. Clean fossil technologies have been analysed (and critiqued) as a 
technical fix before. For example, Sarewitz and Nelson [24] argue that air capture technology is a 
better technical fix than CCS, for a set of practical reasons. Scott [25] argues that geoengineering as a 
technical fix is ethically problematic, in terms of who gets to set criteria for success, and for 
reinforcing a norm that humans should dominate nature. Corner and Pidgeon [26] warn that 
geoengineering as a potentially quick and cheap technical fix has the potential to mobilise economic 
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and ideological interests, and so distract from more expensive mitigation. However, none of these 
authors analyses the political economy of clean fossil in any detail. 
Clean fossil illustrates the role technical fixes play in the evolution of political regimes. Tyfield [10] 
has shown how coal-dominated CCS technology (and our continued underlying reliance on coal, 
notwithstanding recent bankruptcies and turmoil in the coal industry [27, 28]) fits badly with the oil-
based [29] neoliberal regime, even as it appears, prima facie, to align perfectly. It promises to clean 
up fossil based society whilst leaving our lifestyles and production systems more or less intact, and it 
promises to do so mediated by neoliberal policy based on emissions markets that match emissions 
with sinks (or warming with cooling) at the lowest possible cost. Yet, paradoxically, CCS continues to 
struggle, with just one plant attached to fossil-fuelled electricity generation currently in operation, 
out of approximately 1500 plants that the International Energy Agency estimates are needed; and 
with that one also facing significant difficulties [30].  
Neoliberalism is here defined as the unlimited faith in the capacity of markets to solve the problems 
involved in governing human affairs [31]. This means that within neoliberalism there is no way of 
conceiving of existential threats that are unamenable to market-based solutions. Carbon trading can 
handle climate change only if it is seen not as an irreducible and existential ‘threat’ that simply must 
be avoided as a whole, but as a phenomenon that is at least sufficiently malleable and amenable to 
market-based socio-technical intervention as to be manageable (i.e. optimizable) on that basis, i.e. 
as being merely a ‘risk’ [31]. Risks are calculable, manageable by markets and so ‘knowable’ (i.e. by 
what the market subsequently makes manifest as the case) under neoliberalism. But threats cannot 
be thus mitigated and are not calculable and manageable by markets. Instead threats require limits 
set to the freedom of markets on the basis of other, non-market knowledgeable judgements and 
executed by non-market forces, notably government. CCS implementation requires long-term 
planning of infrastructure and investments in large demonstration plants without hope of short-term 
profit – a poor fit with the incremental, nimble, short-term (and financialized) investments favoured 
by markets. CCS might therefore do better under other political regimes that are better equipped to 
deal with existential threats through forms of state planning. 
This paper extends Tyfield’s analysis of CCS to all of clean fossil. Whilst clean fossil was first 
conceived during the peak of the social liberal political regime in the 1960s (what Jessop [32] defines 
as the Keynesian national welfare-warfare state regime), it was after the breakthrough of neoliberal 
[31] policy making in the 1980s and the later formulation of early climate policies that the promise of 
clean fossil, then in the form of CCS, became prominent in the 1990s. Mounting environmental and 
financial challenges to neoliberalism over the last decade has coincided with growing interest in 
geoengineering. Malm [33] argues that in an economy based on and committed to production and 
consumption of fossil fuels, and where current political regimes are neither channelling enough 
capital to renewables nor willing to phase out fossil fuel use, we are faced with a choice of planning 
either the climate or the economy. Geoengineering thus promises to defend fossil interests, 
including many of the world’s largest companies and the wider fossil fuel dominated economy. 
Geoengineering has therefore been attractive also to former climate sceptics and a range of 
conservative lobbyists otherwise unsupportive of energy system changes [34].  
Geoengineering is in important ways even more attractive as a specifically neoliberal technical fix 
than CCS. Where CCS entails a material flow of CO2 from power producer to storage operation, 
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geoengineering’s connection between CO2 source and sink is a book-keeping construct with 
unlimited scope for financialized marketization of the atmosphere, flexibility for polluters, and 
avoidance of state planning [35]. Geoengineering seems to be the acme of neoliberal fossil clean-up 
policy [31]. In addition, the existence of a small set of offsetting-orientated CDR projects, using 
mainly ocean iron fertilisation [36, 37] but also BECCS [38, 39, 40], suggests a potential for 
entrepreneurship and innovation. But we will show that geoengineering has, for similar and different 
reasons to CCS, fitted poorly with neoliberalism. Crucially, the paper also extends Tyfield’s analysis 
by focussing on promises of technical fixes. For both CCS and geoengineering, we analyse promises 
and material implementation, and how they fit with political regimes, separately. This allows us to 
discern the political role of promises as such, and to analyse how combinations of promise and 
(non-)implementation co-evolve with political regimes. 
This paper thus asks how clean fossil as a fix for anthropogenic climate change, and as both promise 
and implementation, has co-evolved since the 1960s with the political regimes that have dominated 
the global system (including technological innovation). What expectations about the relation 
between government and markets have been articulated together with clean fossil promises, and 
what power relations have they therefore promised to defend, challenge, construct or destroy? 
Conversely, what effects have these promises of technical fixing had as regards those apparent 
goals? Finally, what indications do we have concerning the possible future pathways for the co-
evolution of clean fossil and political regimes? In our response to these questions, we provide a 
novel, theoretically grounded characterization of technical fixes, and of their central, if contested, 
role in contemporary society. Finally, we discuss how the co-evolution of clean fossil technical fix 
promises and political regimes makes ambivalence intelligible, and thus helps explain the 
enamourment-distrust paradox.  
 
2. Registers of Promotion and Critique of Technical Fixes 
This section reviews the key literature on technical fixes. Whereas previous critiques of the concept 
are unable to explain the technical fix enamourment-distrust paradox, we argue that a political 
economy approach can substantially illuminate this tension. 
Scott [6, 25] argues that criticisms of technical fixes broadly fall into two categories. On the one 
hand, there are ‘pragmatic’ [25] (or ‘practical’ [6]) criticisms concerning the effectiveness of 
technical fixes, and on the other there are ‘philosophical’ criticisms of technical fix framings as 
manifestations of a technocratic culture that avoids challenging established power relations. 
Pragmatic criticisms operate on the same register as Weinberg’s original promotion of technical 
fixes, but argue that they fail, not succeed, on this basis.  
A fine-grained characterisation of technical fixes on the pragmatic register is provided by LeCain’s 
[41] classification of fixes that either transform key components of a problem (e.g. by turning a 
pollutant into a commodity), relocate problem components (from a context where they cause harm), 
or delay negative effects. While each of these outcomes can be considered successes when 
evaluated against narrow problem framings, they may also produce unintended side effects while 




Discussions on the pragmatic register suggest that technical fixes recur because they are perceived 
to often work and that side-effects can be mitigated against with improved technical knowledge 
about wider system contexts. Contemporary defenders of technological fixes have shown sensitivity 
to pragmatic criticisms [42]. In an attempt to promote effective and reflexive use of technical fixes in 
policy contexts, Sarewitz and Nelson [24] propose that technical fixes are most appropriate when 
focussing on a clearly defined cause-effect relationship within an otherwise complex problem 
context, have verifiable and uncontested effects within that context, and consist of technologies that 
embody an established, technical knowledge core − as opposed to depending on the creation of new 
fundamental knowledge (see also [43]). For them, the success of technical fixes hinges on isolatable 
problem contexts. Their recommendations echo Hughes’ defining distinction between “partial, 
reductionist” technical fixes, and systemic solutions that more fully acknowledge “the complexity of 
the problem to be solved” [44 p. 241, 243]. 
Discussions of technical fixes on the pragmatic register thus indicate that there is scope (under 
particular circumstances) for using technology to solve, if imperfectly, social problems. The 
enamourment-distrust paradox is here merely the contrast between enthusiasm over what works, 
and disappointment with unforeseen side-effects. But, crucially, this argument does not help explain 
the recurrence of technical fixes as solutions also for contested problems, where there is no 
consensus regarding what works, what the salient problem context is, or what drives the scientific-
political work needed to produce consensus and construct an isolatable problem context in the first 
place [45]. Therefore, we need to move beyond the pragmatic register. 
Scott’s second category concerns so-called philosophical criticisms, exemplified with reference to 
among others Lynn White [46] and Alan Drengson [47]. Scott also cites Leo Marx [48], who saw 
technological fixes as rooted in uncritical beliefs in technological progress as the primary measure of 
societal reform, one so embedded in our culture that it shapes our very conception of history. For 
Scott, philosophical criticisms portray technical fixes as emerging from ‘basic assumptions’ in our 
civilisation’s view of progress and commitment to instrumentalism. This rendering would suggest 
that the enamourment-distrust paradox can be seen not just as a result of pragmatic, rationalist 
assessments of what works (and what doesn’t), but also a commitment to the symbolic values of 
‘T’echnology (and critiques of it). 
Discussion on the philosophical register usefully draws our attention to the fact that technical fixes 
have significance not just as implemented socio-technical systems, but also as a pattern of thought. 
We would add that the mere making of promises of future technical fixes has impacts, of both 
practical and political kinds. This stance resonates with recent science and technology studies 
scholarship on technological promises and sociotechnical imaginaries–or “collectively imagined 
forms of social … order” [49 p. 120] reflected in states’ justifications for large-scale technology 
projects. Science and technology studies has also taught us about experts’ role(s) in closing down 
and depoliticising promises of science and technology [50]. Understanding the dynamics of promise-
making has direct relevance for on-going efforts to open up expert framings and facilitate extended, 
plural debates that re-politicise innovation processes [51]. Notable recent contributions to these 
efforts include the rapidly growing literature on anticipatory governance [52] and responsible 
research and innovation [53]. This literature suggests that the whole concept of a lasting ‘fixed’ 
solution is problematic and instead the ‘solution’ is progressively shifting to a process of re-
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politicised contestation about innovation, leading to more profound changes in society, not just 
technology band-aids on given social structures.  
But why do technical fix promises often persist in the face of sustained contestation by plural voices? 
And, more generally, why has the mode of technical fix thinking been so resistant in spite of the 
development of a seeming ‘common sense’ that gives the very term a negative ring? The 
philosophical critique goes some way to explain this. Drengson [47] warned that the deeply rooted 
technocratic and instrumentalist worldview reifies power relations, and that it underlies technical 
fixes that seek to address specific problems without challenging reigning paradigms. Dominant 
power regimes play a key role here: in the context of climate change, for instance, Hamilton [54] 
claims that focusing on technical fixes allows us to avoid uncomfortable conclusions about the need 
to challenge entrenched patterns of power and consumption. Criticisms on the philosophical register 
thus suggest that technical fix promises have a defensive element to them, that they conserve in-
place power structures and discredit or distract attention away from measures that might weaken 
the systemic foundations of dominant regimes, and this fact matters for the resilience of technical 
fix thinking. Technical fixes will thus tend to appear exactly where there is contestation. On this 
register, the enamourment-distrust paradox becomes an interplay between the technical fix 
promises from powerful, but blinkered, elites (and their experts) and the usually, but not always, 
suppressed insights from and resistance of marginalised (lay) people.  
Whilst the philosophical critique suggests that the recurrence of technical fix promises is related to 
dominant power regimes, it leaves the specifics of this interaction un-scrutinised. The philosophical 
critique does not explain which specific technical fixes are supported, what exactly they defend, and 
under what particular circumstances that support or defence will work or fail. For example, what 
particular interests have the clean fossil promise functioned to serve, and how has it done so? And 
how should we understand the ebb and flow of support for specific clean fossil technologies?  
Nor does the philosophical critique say much about how new political regimes could emerge, in co-
evolution with technical fixes. Whilst it seems entirely plausible that the promise of clean fossil fits 
well with the current neoliberal political regime, can we see, in the misalignments between the two 
that are also evident, seeds of different – worse or better – future regimes? Technical fix promises 
cannot be dismissed as merely defensive, as per the philosophical critique, but can also be seen to 
signal hope, even if it is seemingly against the odds. 
A general reference to defence of, and resistance against, current power regimes is thus not a 
sufficient explanation of the enamourment-distrust paradox; we need to provide an analysis of what 
fixes work, when, and why that is both substantive and historically situated. For this, we need to add 
a political economy register to the literature that affords a co-evolutionary analysis of the political, 
institutional and material mechanisms that mediate technical fixes: both as a form of (loosely 
conceptualised) societal thinking style, as per the philosophical register, and in ways that serve to 
defend specific, current power relations, but in contingent, imperfect ways, thereby allowing also for 
(conceptualization of) change to both political regime and technical fixes. On such a political 
economy register, both enamourment and distrust can then be seen as reasonable attitudes to have 
towards the co-evolution of technical fixes and political regimes, if not necessarily in equal measures 




3. A Cultural Political Economy Perspective on Technical Fixes 
We here develop a framework for analysing what technical fixes do, as promises and as realised 
socio-technical systems, and how historically contingent forms co-evolve with (dominant) political 
economic regimes. 
We take as our starting point a model of the co-evolutionary link between technology and political 
regimes under liberal capitalism, where we assume that promises of new technology have 
generative potential insofar as they are used to legitimate (arrow 1 in Figure 2) new spatio-temporal 
fixes1, i.e. new contingent opportunities for capital, which defer its tendency to crisis, whilst shifting 
problems to other places or times [55]. Clean fossil can usefully be seen as a spatio-temporal fix. It 
would offer opportunities for investment, and so potentially be a response to not only the ongoing 
climate crisis, but also the financial one. Many CDR type technologies would require vast amounts of 
land, displacing other uses and livelihoods and so constitute a spatial fix, whereas especially SRM 
type technologies risk postponing warming problems into the future as a temporal fix [56]. 
 
Co-evolution of technologies and political regimes 
 
 
Figure 2. Co-evolution of technologies and political regimes.  
 
Spatio-temporal fixes, in turn, legitimise and enable specific political regimes (arrow 2). By political 
regime we here mean both a specific set of actors that dominate society economically and 
politically, but crucially also a set of institutions embodying their hegemonic ideals and rationality. 
Whilst liberalism has been the underlying regime under capitalism, a more fine-grained periodisation 
is possible, with distinctly different political regimes - most lately neoliberalism, and before that 
social-liberalism. The political regime tends to favour particular kinds of innovation regimes (arrow 
3), i.e. sets of rules and norms for what kinds of innovation to support [57]. Innovation regimes thus 
support and enable the development of specific technologies (arrow 4).  
1 Not to be confused with technical fixes. Explanation follows below. 
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Whilst there can be positive feedback loops in the model leading to periods of relative stability, 
there is also constant change at each point in the model. And, equally crucial, each step of this cycle 
is mediated and manifest only in concrete actions, so that such positive feedback loops are not an 
inherent part of this model in the abstract, but a specific achievement of ongoing effort and practice 
in the form of mutual strategic alignment. Constant recalibration and realignment is going on, and at 
times the system transitions to new political regimes. 
The capitalist imperative to innovate is an important driver of this dynamic, and science an 
increasingly important source of novelty. Under the current neoliberal regime, the ideal innovation 
is one that promises quick economic returns, as well as private control of technology and resources. 
A key role of the state is to create new markets for such technologies, legitimised as solutions to 
common problems. In contrast, under the post-war social liberal innovation regime, the role of the 
market was circumscribed by state regulation, and the state took on responsibility for some kinds of 
innovation and ownership of certain operations [29, 58]. 
‘Technology’ is here shorthand for both scientific knowledge production and the development of 
socio-technical systems. Science is a rich source of promises (arrow 1a in Figure 2) of new STFs, 
creating rhetorical spaces for them, and development realises (arrow 1b) these promises as material, 
socio-technical systems. The model thus captures the prospective rhetorical use of promises to 
legitimise action in the now, and specifically to create new spaces, and define new kinds of objects 
that can be developed and invested in. It also indicates how technological promises, alongside 
development of material socio-technical systems, are crucial for the evolution of capital and political 
regimes.  
We are here interested in technical fixes, as a special category of technologies. On our political 
economy register, a technical fix promise is an attempt to legitimise, with reference to an important 
problem, a spatio-temporal fix that can shore up a particular, current (more or less problematic) 
political regime. Such a technical fix may or may not work practically and/or politically, and may 
produce unexpected outcomes in the longer run. For example, the case for clean fossil is as a 
response to climate change which clearly qualifies as a collectively recognised problem, and is 
dependent on the technology leaving hard-to-reform fossil-fuel-based value chains including 
consumer behaviours untouched, with the promise of doing so in a way that is compatible with 
neoliberal market-based climate policies, and hence defending the socio-political status quo.  
While technological promises potentially assist and legitimise the setting up of new STFs, and thence 
the evolution of capitalism from one dominant regime to another, they need not, however, do this 
or successfully achieve this. These promises can also be connected with the system-defensive and 
conservative role of technical fixes. When, for example, CCS technology promises to legitimise a new 
use of (and investment in) the underground for the purposes of waste storage, this does open up a 
new space for capitalist expansion. But the main attractiveness of the idea is its promise to conserve 
previous investments and so maintain rather than supplant earlier STFs. We thus need to define as a 
special category defensive STFs that serve to support other already-existing STFs. 
Finally, no promises can determine eventual spatio-temporal fix outcomes, which rather are brought 
about through an unfolding, contingent innovation process, with an inherent capacity for surprises. 
Part of the reason for this is that no articulation of a promise is ever completely monovalent, but 
rather multiple, and so comes with built-in alternative outcomes. But crises and surprises are also an 
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inherent potential of a distributed process involving multiple actors with some autonomy and 
agency. Any attempt to pin down and fix a problem tends to be imperfect, and problems tend to 
overflow the bounds set up for it, creating new problems [35]. We thus also need to be aware of the 
capacity of promises, contingently, to lead to STFs other than those expected when taken at face 
value. And so political regimes are not just forever re-produced through technical fixes, but can also 
evolve through them. Technical fixes can thus also contribute to regime shifts. 
With this elaboration, we have a model of the co-evolution of technical fixes and political regimes.  
Within this model, promises of technical fixes legitimise, and actual manifestation of technical fixes 
sediments, defensive spatio-temporal fixes. Both types of fix, therefore, serve to ‘fix’, patch or 
manage the ongoing emergence of ruptures at system level that are an inescapable feature of an 
expanding capitalist political economy, with the technical fix a special subset of the broader category 
of spatio-temporal fixes. What is crucial, however, is that the promise and actual delivery of a 
technical fix must be analytically distinguished and their effects explored separately.  
This paper will apply this elaboration of technical fixes to the case of clean fossil, and we will use this 
model to guide our investigation into the co-evolution of clean fossil promises and political regimes. 
 
4. Methodology 
The paper aims to use the case of co-evolution of clean fossil promises and political regimes to 1) 
investigate what is defended by technical fix promises and when such promises work or fail, and 2) 
identify the conditions that make technical fix ambivalence intelligible. 
To meet the first aim, we need to document and map clean fossil promises from their emergence in 
the 1960s, to today. We identify and describe episodes of politically relevant (re)articulations [47] of 
clean fossil technology. We are interested in clean fossil not just in terms of narrowly technical 
function but also in terms of its implied social function [38 p.124]. We also add a specific focus on 
the irreducibly capitalist political-economic character of the dominant regimes, unlike in previous 
historical accounts of clean fossil [11,12]. Specifically, we analyse the explicit or implied role of states 
and markets in the visions for clean fossil articulated by prominent organisations, e.g. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and governments. We are especially interested in 
what role, if any, the state has in the articulation - as regulator or owner in social liberal 
articulations, or as market creator in neoliberal ones. We focus on dominating, prominent 
articulations and attempt no exhaustive mapping, whilst also acknowledging that there are 
significant ambiguities and diversities regarding the role of the state articulated in the episodes.  
Based on this mapping, we are then able to analyse the co-evolution of clean fossil promises as 
technical fixes and the political regime. We identify alignments and misalignments between clean 
fossil promises and the neoliberal regime, and use them to explain the stability of the neoliberal 
regime, and the stability and change of clean fossil promises.  
To meet the second aim, we also explore how the political regime may co-evolve with stable or 
changing clean fossil promises in the future. The retrospective and prospective analyses together 
help us illustrate the indeterminate and unpredictable nature of such co-evolution. We may then 
show how, even in the face of an entrenched pattern of clean fossil promises supporting a seemingly 
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stable neoliberal regime, we can still reasonably expect the evolution of different political futures, in 
co-evolution with new and old clean fossil type technical fix promises, to be possible. Ambivalence 
towards technical fixes is thus an intelligible attitude in the case of clean fossil. 
Finally, we will be able to generalise from the clean fossil case, and draw conclusions about the 
(political economic) nature of technical fixes, and explain their paradoxical resilience. 
 
5. Results 
This section describes six significant re-articulation episodes that together provide the contours of a 
shift from social liberal to neoliberal articulations of clean fossil, and perhaps beyond.  
 
Episode 1: Clean fossil initially proposed in a social liberal context 
In the mid-1960s, the US government funded an environmental research report [59], the first 
government statement on both global warming and clean fossil [11, 12, 13, 14]. The report presents 
clean fossil as a potential response to anthropogenic climate change, in the context of a social liberal 
articulation of the problem.  
The report’s recommendations state that “[t]he possibilities of deliberately bringing about 
countervailing climatic changes therefore need to be thoroughly explored” [59 p. 127], and 
highlights two albedo changing (i.e. SRM type) technologies: spraying particles over large ocean 
surfaces, and injecting condensation (and freezing) nuclei into high cirrus clouds. The report does 
not discuss CO2 sequestration, or removal of CO2 from flue gases. These notions and the term 
geoengineering itself were introduced by Marchetti [60] more than a decade later. 
The report articulates a tension between the need to allow industrial consumer society to continue 
and a need for government intervention to protect citizens and future generations. Regulation is the 
main approach discussed for dealing with pollution. The report does mention the need to look into 
the scope for ”tax-like … effluent charges” [59 p. 17], prefiguring a later shift to neoliberal 
articulations and emissions trading as a preferred policy. 
The report does not propose climate change policy beyond research funding, and even in terms of 
research, clean fossil wasn’t to become a vigorous area of research and debate until the 1990s (in 
the form of CCS), cf. [15] and Figure 3. The report does provide an indication of early social liberal 




 Figure 3. Number of citations of the President’s Scientific Advisory Committee report of 1965 [59] 
and Marchetti’s 1977 paper [60]  
Note: Data from Google Scholar, produced using Publish or Perish software, downloaded Feb. 2016. 
 
The rise and fall of neoliberally articulated CCS technology 
The 1980s saw the breakthrough of neoliberalism and the birth of neoliberal climate policy with 
emphasis on carbon price as the prime mover [61, 62]. Amongst clean fossil technologies, especially 
interest in CCS grew from the mid-1980s, and it was articulated neoliberally from the start. Indeed, 
the technology has played a key part in reconciling fossil fuel interests (and climate scepticism) with 
the climate change imperative under the neoliberal regime. 
 
Episode 2: Early articulation 
In 1991, Norway became one of the first countries to introduce a carbon tax. The tax was intended 
not only as a climate change mitigation measure, but also as a way to unleash the technological 
potential of CCS, applied to CO2 from offshore gas turbines. To evade the tax, the Norwegian 
petroleum company Statoil launched the Sleipner CO2 storage project in 1996 [63, 64] . Sleipner 
became the world’s first large-scale geological CO2 storage operation [64]. 
The most expensive part of CCS involves separating CO2 from flue gases from fossil fuelled energy 
production. The Sleipner project instead used already separated CO2 from natural gas processing, 
and so capture from flue gases remained un-demonstrated at large scale. In this sense the tax failed 



































































geological storage of CO2 [65, 66], but it was also an early demonstration of the failure of the 
neoliberal regime to provide a sufficient carbon price to drive CCS implementation. 
 
Episode 3: The apex 
Neoliberal belief in carbon trading, and its ability to help deliver CCS implementation, remained 
strong. In 2005, the IPCC, the key body synthesizing international climate change science for 
policymakers, published a special report on CCS [67], providing critical legitimacy and evidence for its 
technical feasibility [68].  
The IPCC report advocates carbon trading as a policy to drive investment, but also recognises the 
high price tag of CCS. To bridge the financial gap between the high costs of CCS development and 
the near-term financial benefits of implementing the technology, the report advocates public-private 
partnerships and government investment in demonstration projects. The intention was to reduce 
costs [68] and enable later carbon market-driven deployment. 
The IPCC special report was intended to break a deadlock in international climate policy by 
proposing a technical solution that would not alienate fossil fuel interests, and bring countries 
including the US on board [69]. Government investment in CCS promised a fix of neoliberal climate 
policy, and the IPCC report legitimized that promise. 
 
Episode 4: Giving up? 
This optimism was followed by very slow progress for CCS demonstration, as well as international 
climate policy generally. Carbon prices remained low or absent, and few CCS projects materialised 
[70]. The neoliberal articulation of CCS faltered. 
CCS advocates in the US began emphasising CO2 utilisation as a pathway to CCS development after 
the 2009 failure of key legislation that could have sparked a carbon trading system. Utilization 
includes Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) using captured CO2, a practice largely at odds with climate 
mitigation. US CCS advocates promoted the acronym ‘CCUS’ (Carbon Capture Utilization and 
Storage) to emphasise the commercial viability of CCS-related technologies applied primarily to EOR 
[71]. The CCUS re-articulation was an attempt to maintain momentum with the hope that 
technology development spill over back to CCS [72]. The US government took several steps to 
support this reframing, and CCUS became established as the official US policy lingo in CCS-related 
efforts. In 2012, the Department of Energy renamed its annual meeting on CCS the ‘Annual Carbon 
Capture, Utilization and Sequestration Conference’, while the US-led, ministerial-level international 
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum instituted a CO2 utilisation taskforce [73], spreading the 
term to other countries. 
EOR could become a neoliberal clean fossil promise. Monitoring, measurement and verification of 
injected CO2 could incorporate EOR operations into emissions markets mechanisms. But, crucially, 
the CCUS re-articulation did not hinge on emissions markets to support EOR. Rather, it was the hope 
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of revenue from EOR to help finance development of capture technology that drove this 
development. 
CCUS signified a deferral of the neoliberal CCS promise, in favour of spontaneous market dynamics 
(akin to classical liberalism). The promise of CCS to reconcile fossil interests and the climate 
imperative was stretched close to its breaking point. CCUS was also not a wholesale deferral of the 
neoliberal CCS promise, as it has lived on in for example IPCC reports [74]. Rather, we have seen a 
diversification of articulations of CCS. Also, CCS has been boosted by recent attention to BECCS as a 
carbon sink technology. 
 
The political ambivalence of recent geoengineering promises 
The articulation of CCS with the neoliberal regime worked well as a promise of a technical fix to 
climate change, but remained unimplemented. In contrast, more recent geoengineering initiatives 
have had an even more troubled relationship with the neoliberal regime, as not even their promises 
have been well aligned. 
 
Episode 5: Promotion and warnings 
Geoengineering research grew rapidly in the early 2000s [15], and in 2009, a report from the UK 
Royal Society consolidated and legitimised (in science policy if not immediately in climate policy) this 
renewed interest [75]. The report classifies geoengineering technologies into two categories: CDR 
and SRM, with the emphasis on the primarily technical difference between radiation and 
sequestration. 
The report devotes significant attention to geoengineering’s risks and uncertainties of 
geoengineering. Its governance recommendations include calls for regulation of both research [76], 
and deployment [75]. The state is assigned responsibility for making geoengineering happen, using 
the familiar neoliberal carbon price, established through taxes or emissions trading. The report is 
distinctly ambivalent about geoengineering entrepreneurship, both lauding private 
entrepreneurship’s ability to mobilise resources and accelerate development, and expressing 
concern that “commercial involvement could bypass or neglect the socio-economic, environmental 
and regulatory dimensions” [75 p. 44].  Overall, the report has elements of neoliberal policies of 
market creation, but also a strong social liberal regulatory role for government.  
 
Episode 6: A partial resolution 
This ambivalence was carried through to the 2014 IPCC 5th Assessment Report [74], the first IPCC 
report to include a comprehensive review of geoengineering [77], which consolidated an uptake of 
the idea in climate policy related discourse. The report partly resolves the political ambivalence, by 
treating CDR and SRM separately and very differently.  
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CDR – and especially BECCS [74 p. 23] – is included in climate scenarios. The report states that BECCS 
is likely required to avoid warming above 2 degrees, and that any delays in emissions reduction will 
increase our need for CDRs [74]. SRM technology is excluded from the scenarios because it “entail[s] 
numerous uncertainties, side effects, risks and shortcomings, and has particular governance and 
ethical implications” [74 p. 26]. SRM raises serious issues of how to ensure “legitimate decision 
making, monitoring and control” [78 p. 488]. There is no suggestion that markets can provide such 
legitimacy, and responsibility for decision-making is assigned to states. 
Overall, there are plenty of caveats to the report’s commitment to neoliberal market creation, with 
strong limitations placed on not only what is possible but also legitimate concerning SRM. The report 
presents SRM with such strong concerns that it is a distinct challenge for neoliberal innovation 




Despite evidence of alignments between the neoliberal political regime and clean fossil technical fix 
promises, the above episodes do not suggest strong productive feedback loops (cf. Figure 2), but 
rather obstacles and cracks. From the perspective adopted here, therefore, this suggests significant 
ruptures and weaknesses at the level of the neoliberal regime itself (and hence its innovation 
model), since it is unable to implement solutions, or, in the case of geoengineering, (wholly) 
dominate even the discourse of what should be quintessentially neoliberal technical fix. This, in turn, 
leads to further pressures on the regime, and contributes to undermining it. 
But why then has the CCS technical fix promise remained relatively stable over a period of around 30 
years, despite contestation and failure to deliver? The promise of fossil abatement has upheld the 
climate policy regime and its neoliberal emphasis on emissions trading and offsetting. The CCS 
promise has helped build political and industrial support for international climate policy, and has 
been co-constitutive of CO2 emissions trading markets and associated efforts at stabilising and re-
invigorating the neoliberal regime. Given the neoliberal innovation regime’s inability to produce 
implementation via competition and markets, continued commitment to the promise of CCS has 
been necessary, as a response to the misalignments. 
It seems a fair hypothesis that BECCS could be the next technical fix promise lined up for this role of 
discursive stabiliser. And this does not bode well for its development since support by and framing in 
terms of a neoliberal political regime that is itself in trouble may well be a positive impediment to its 
success, as it has arguably proven for CCS.  
In this analysis, the technical fix promises are defensive precisely as long as they are not acted upon 
in the sense of technology implementation. This is not an argument about conspiracy and deception 
(although there may be elements of that), but an analytical observation of the role of the CCS 
promise, in the context of a dynamic neoliberal innovation regime and ongoing attempts to preserve 
it, and its oil-based political regime. As promises, the imagined defensive STFs can be used not only 
to legitimise new STFs, but also to defend existing investments (in previous STFs) even without 
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realising the defensive STFs. Cf. arrow 1a in Figure 4. At the very least, their realisation can be 
deferred for some time without much harming the usefulness of the promise as a defensive move. 
 
 
Figure 4. Co-evolution of technical fixes and defensive spatio-temporal fixes.  
 
Moreover, why hasn’t geoengineering been unambiguously articulated as a neoliberal technical fix 
promise? One reason appears to be that geoengineering is a heterogeneous category where some 
component technologies fit better with emissions trading than others. We can distinguish between 
what we call ‘one-off’ and ‘modular’ geoengineering, which is about how divisible geoengineering 
technologies are. For example, there are several good reasons for not having multiple stratospheric 
aerosol injection projects running in parallel. It is potentially a powerful technique, and doing too 
much of it too quickly (or ceasing too abruptly) can disrupt the climate system. Multiple projects 
would also make it more difficult to know the effect of each. For these reasons, and others, 
centralised control has been seen as paramount [74, 75]. In contrast, with most sequestration 
techniques modular deployment is unavoidable, and with their much slower impact there is less risk 
inherent in a decentralised governance system, such as a market. Modular geoengineering 
technologies are much more promising as neoliberal spatio-temporal fixes than one-off ones.  
But then why has the umbrella term of geoengineering survived its misalignment with the neoliberal 
innovation regime? Whilst some CDR technologies, notably afforestation, already had a foothold in 
climate policy, SRM technologies didn’t and had the most to gain from joint promotion. The 
dominant definition is symmetrical with respect to CDR and SRM, but much geoengineering debate 
has tended to be about SRM, or even about stratospheric aerosol injection as the emblematic 
geoengineering technology. An ambivalent articulation in relation to the neoliberal regime is better 
for SRM technology proponents than an outright rejection, and so the geoengineering label still has 
traction amongst them. The label has also resonated quite well amongst detractors, and in the 
media, which has helped sustain its use. 
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The survival of the geoengineering umbrella term may have further explanations. Echoing the above 
argument about the technical fix promises’ defensive function, the discussion of SRM as a highly 
problematic promise requiring state regulation can be interpreted as a functional threat. 
Stratospheric aerosol injection evokes fears of illiberal political regimes [79], reminding us of the 
militarised cold war context of the idea’s initial articulation. The illiberal SRM threat makes CDR and 
CCS seem reasonable as neoliberal technical fixes, and, by extension, defends the neoliberal regime. 
The neoliberal regime hasn’t managed even to fully shape the articulation of the geoengineering 
promise, which evokes social liberal-style concerns about the SRM’s impacts and illiberal threats. As 
a climate change response, geoengineering is more flagrantly limited as neoliberal technical fix 
promise than is CCS. Moreover, geoengineering offers even shakier support for the neoliberal 
regime itself. Instead of self-sustaining and dynamic positive feedback loops between technical fix 
(promise and actuality) and political regimes, we find both parallel processes and relations between 
them that are weakening and fragmenting.  
The misalignments between clean fossil and the neoliberal regime do not spell immediate collapse 
of the latter. Rather, what we see is a degree of stability whereby the neoliberal regime is defended, 
at least temporarily, by - on the one hand - retaining the promise whilst deferring deployment (of 
CCS), and - on the other - shoring up an imperfectly neoliberal promise with threats of illiberal 
political regimes (of certain types of SRM). While misalignments can be made to work for the current 
regime, the cracks seem to be widening. 
We have seen here how technical fixes can be not only materially defensive (fixing the problem as an 
end of pipe, add-on solution) but also discursively defensive (greenwash) and that the relation 
between these two defensive functions is complex. Our analysis goes beyond the philosophical 
critiques of technical fixes in analysing the specifics of what is being defended, how it is being 
defended and why this may be effective or not. 
 
6.2 Futures 
Our analysis breaks with both pragmatic and philosophical critiques of technical fixes. We highlight 
how technical fix promises not only represent potentially workable solutions, or discursive acts that 
legitimise spatio-temporal fixes in defence of current power regimes, but that promises also have a 
more radically generative potential. Currently dominating articulations do not predict the future, 
which may unfold in surprising ways, but we do see minor alternative articulations as ’seeds’ of 
radical futures that can productively be discussed using our theoretical framework. We now turn, 
therefore, to exploring how clean fossil may co-evolve with the currently dominant political regime 
in the future.  
Multiple scenarios are possible, supported by varying amounts of evidence. Here we outline four 
possible scenarios for the future co-evolution of different combinations of political regimes and 
clean fossil promises and deployments. The scenarios include continued neoliberalism, but also 




As a baseline, we can think of continued neoliberal non-implementation of clean fossil. The carbon 
price signal would remain weak, and current articulations are here quite stable, with little 
technology deployed beyond CCUS. This is close to business as usual, so there is supporting 
evidence. But, we also know that the neoliberal regime is under stress [58], partly due to its limited 
success in shaping technical fixes (and especially ones for global ecological challenges, such as 
geoengineering) both materially and discursively, while underpinning significant pressures on the 
climate, and may come to be replaced. 
Scenario 2 
Another possibility, perhaps a worst case scenario from a democratic point of view, involves 
recourse to illiberal SRM (cf. [79]). Here, post-democratic apathy segues into autocracy or oligarchy, 
where a technocratic elite deploys the technology, maybe justified as a response to climate 
emergencies. In an Orwellian version of this scenario, the term geoengineering might thrive. The 
centralising quality of some SRM technologies has reasonably made many observers wary of their 
democratic consequences, but there is otherwise little evidence for this future unfolding.  
Scenario 3  
The antithesis to scenario 2 is a strongly democratic geoengineering, with bottom-up, local 
engagements with the climate [80, 81]. This would require a radical re-articulation of both 
geoengineering and the climate change problem, and a focus on relatively low-tech and small-scale 
technologies. Martindale [82] analyses Transition Town practices as potential democratic 
geoengineering, and here we have moved beyond what would currently be labelled technical fixes 
as such practices are typically not readily quantified and commodified [35]. But beyond these 
academic exercises, there is little direct evidence for a link being forged between the geoengineering 
term and grassroots practices, and even these do not seriously discuss how such ‘democratic’ GE 
could, and would have to, co-evolve with a change of political regime.  
Scenario 4  
An additional scenario is to take the current remaining interest in fossil CCS and the growing interest 
in some CDRs seriously. This would seem to require a resurgent but still liberal regime with a 
stronger regulatory intervention and even public ownership of infrastructure. As Tyfield [10] 
discussed, a scenario of this kind might develop in coal-dependent China with its strong state, 
although not in a social liberal form but a liberalism 2.0 reminiscent of the 19th century liberalism of 
coal’s initial global ascendancy. This is characterised by the primacy of individualised negative liberty 
and a continuing privileging of markets, but where markets are nonetheless deposed from their 
centrality under neoliberalism by a resurgent argument in favour of (‘strong’) states rectifying 
market failures. The geoengineering concept might here be abandoned, in favour of CDR.  
This systematic speculative analysis of four scenarios shows that our conceptual model can also help 
us think through the varying political roles and characters of (promises of) technical fixes in potential 
futures more or less foreshadowed by current articulations. Where promises are discursively 
defensive, they might nevertheless indicate potentially radical material change in the emerging 
future. In relation to pragmatic critiques of technical fixes, we have added the insight that technical 
fixes can prefigure technical (and political) change even when they don’t work in practical terms. 
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And in relation to the philosophical critique, we have argued that technical fixes may not only be 
conservative of power regimes but also engender societal change. In short, exploring the co-
evolution of technical fixes and political regimes affords insights into both, and their inter-relations, 
which substantially confound the expectations of more familiar forms of critique of technical fixes.  
Together, the retrospective and prospective analyses above also show how, even in the face of an 
entrenched pattern of clean fossil promises supporting a seemingly stable neoliberal regime, we can 
still reasonably expect the evolution of different political regime futures, better or worse than the 
current one, to be possible. In this context of inherently unstable co-evolution of clean fossil 
technical fixes with political regimes, ambivalence about those fixes is readily intelligible. It is 
reasonable to be simultaneously enamoured and distrustful of clean fossils, though not in some kind 
of rational balance but as a dynamic and changing judgement regarding the specifics of the technical 
fix in question and the evolution of its socio-technical trajectory and the political regime it is 
understood, however inchoately, to be conditioning. 
 
7. Conclusion  
We have here developed a cultural political economy conceptualisation of technical fixes, as both 
promises and implemented socio-technical systems, and applied it to the case of clean fossil as a 
response to climate change. Seeing technical fix promises as attempted defensive justifications of 
existing and new spatio-temporal fixes allows us to shed new light on the recent co-evolution of 
clean fossil articulations with political regimes. Moreover, analysis of the dynamic and unruly 
process of aligning promises of technical fixes and the political regime provides evidence for a 
systematic speculative analysis about potential future regimes.  
The analysis allows us to explain the relative stability of specific technical fix promises in the face of 
faltering implementation efforts and ongoing contestation. And we are able to re-theorise, beyond 
established philosophical critique, the general tendency to resort to technical fix promises exactly 
when they are the both most ineffectual and most contested. Opening up technical promises 
challenges technocracy, but the political regime can accommodate and thrive off a multiplicity of 
promises, and use (at least some of) them to sustain itself. But at the same time, the imperfect and 
never completely stable ways in which the regime and technical fixes are aligned may contain also 
the seeds of radically new spatio-temporal fixes supporting a different political economy regime.  
Defining technical fix promises as attempted justifications of defensive spatio-temporal fixes gives 
the concept a new theoretical foundation as well as a new critical edge. What is at stake is not just 
pragmatic, rationalist knowledge claims (cf. pragmatic critique), or culturally embedded technocratic 
modes of problem-solving and a general technocratic tendency to deflect attention from power 
relations (cf. philosophical critique), but also the fate of specific (existing and new) spaces for 
capitalist investment (through markets or the state), and the future specific form of capitalist social 
relations. 
Our analysis also shows that ambivalence towards clean fossil technical fix promises is intelligible, 
given the inherent instability of their co-evolution with neoliberalism and future political regimes. 
The balance of enamourment and distrust will vary with the specifics of the historical situation and 
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the details of the technical fix proposals being presented. Even so, given capitalism’s crisis 
tendencies, our enamourment with technical fixes is unlikely to be completely replaced by distrust. 
And so technical fix promises will tend to recur, seemingly paradoxically. Enamourment with 
technical fixes is not just about whether they work, or whether they defend the establishment, but 
also about what (however faint) political hope they signal, alongside (commonsensical) distrust and 
despair. 
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